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) 
[L. A. No. 22258. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.] 
D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. BEN C. DEANE et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Contracts-Modi1ication-Consideration.-Where' oral modifi-
cation of written contract for cement work is made before 
performance is started, the substitution of new rights and 
duties based on a new method of computing the quantity of 
concrete is adequate consideration for relinquishment of re-
ciprocal rights of the parties under the old. 
[2] Id.-Modi1ication-Written Contracts.-Civ. Code, § 1698, re-
lating to modification of written contracts, invalidates oral 
contracts of modification that are unexecuted and validates 
executed agreements that might otherwise fail for lack of 
consideraion. 
[3] Id.-Modi1ication-Written Contracts.-Since in such cases as 
agreements to accept less than is due under the terms of a 
written contract, or to accept performance at a later date 
than providcd in the writing, the modification agreement re-
quires no additional act or forbearance on the part of the 
obligor, it can only be executed to the extent that the obligee 
accepts performance in accordance with its terms. 
[4] Id.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Where there is con-
sideration for an oral agreement modifying a written contract, 
[lJ See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 227; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 407. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 191; [2,4] Contracts, 
§ 189; [3J Contracts, § 190. 
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the rights and duties of both parties to the written contract 
are affected and execution by one party is sufficient to allow 
him to enforce the modification against the other, whether 
or not the latter has performed on his part. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County .• Julius V. Patrosso, Judge. Reversed. 
Glen Byhymer and Lewis M. Andrews for Appellant. 
Edmond Gattone for Respondents. 
Gardiner Johnson, Thos. E. Stanton, Jr., and John A. 
Sproul, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment 
for defendants entered after a demurrer to its fourth amended 
complaint was sustained without leave to amend. 
Plaintiff alleged that it entered into a written contract to 
perform the cement work for a building that defendants 
were erecting. Under the terms of the written contract the 
cement work for the foundation walls and retaining walls 
was to be paid for at the rate of $0.76 per cubic foot, and 
the basis of the payment was to be determined by the actual 
ineasurement of forms. Plaintiff further alleged, "That there-
after, and prior to the commencement of the performance 
of said work, a conference was held between plaintiff and 
the defendants, at which it was orally agreed and mutually 
stated, each to the other, that the phrase, '(3) TERMS OF PAY-
MENT: Basis of payment to be determined by actual measure-
ment of forms' was ambiguous and, furthermore, that it did 
not provide for the method of computing cubic concrete work 
not contained within the forms, and the defendants then 
and there, in exchange for their mutual covenants and agree-
ments in that respect, and for the purpose of eliminating 
possible future dispute between the parties to said contract, 
and in order to provide for that portion of the concrete that 
under the plans was required to be poured outside of forms 
(and which ultimately was actually poured outside of forms) 
orally expanded and clarified said written agreement by en-
tering into an understanding that, in order to properly arrive 
at the amount of cubic concrete work in foundation and re-
taining walls and footings upon said jobsite, whether poured 
within or outside of forms, the parties to said contract would 
) 
) 
Aug. 1952] D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONST. CO. 1). DEANE 431 
[39 C.2d 428; 246 P.2d 846] 
calculate the amount of cubic yards of concrete actually poured, 
whether within forms or outside of forms, and, with respect 
to such classes of work only (to ,vit: cubic concrete work in 
foundations and retaining walls and footings), at the con-
tract price of 76 cents per cubic foot, or $20.52 per cubic 
yard, less a deduction therefrom of the usual and customary 
allowance for normal shrinkage and wastage [of 3% per 
cent], and that, in order to implement said agreement and 
understanding, the plaintiff would furnish to the defendants 
each day during the performance of said contract, copies of 
delivery tickets, a copy of each delivery ticket to accompany 
the delivery of each consignment of concrete delivered on 
the jobsite, such delivery tickets to show the actual cubic 
yards of concrete poured on the jobsite each day and until 
the full performance of the contract." 
Plaintiff also alleged that it had performed the contract 
as modified and supplied the required daily reports of de-
liveries and that under the terms of the contract as modified 
there remained due and owing the sum of $12,182.99 out of 
a total of $86,830.93. 
Defendants contend that the alleged modification of the 
written contract is invalid because of lack of consideration 
and because it was not in writing, and that accordingly, the 
complaint is fatally defective in failing to alleged that any sum 
is due and unpaid under the terms of the written contract. 
It is unnecessary to pass upon the conflicting contentions 
of the parties as to whether the alleged resolution of an am-
biguity in the terms of the written contract would constitute 
sufficient consideration for the oral agreement in this case. 
Under the terms of the modification the method of computing 
the quantity of concrete was changed, and the amount actually 
poured on the jobsite was substituted for an amount to be 
determined by the measurement of the forms. If this modifi-
cation had been made in writing, it is clear that it would 
have been a valid contract supported by adequate considera-
tion. [1] Since the modification was made before perform-
ance was started, the substitution of the new rights and 
duties based upon the new method of measurement was ade-
quate consideration for the relinquishment of the reciprocal 
rights of the parties under the old. (Fleming v. Law, 163 
Cal. 227, 2:33 [124 P. 1018] ; Gottlieb v. Tait's Inc., 97 Cal. 
App. 235, 237-238 [275 P. 446] ; Sass v. Hank, 108 Cal.App.2d 
207, 215 [238 P.2d 652].) Moreover, plaintiff promised to 
) 
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provide daily reports, and both parties were relieved of the 
necessity of computing the volume of the forms from linear 
measurements. 
Section 1698 of the Civil Code provides: "A contract in 
writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an 
executed oral agreement, and not otherwise." Section 1661 
provides: "An executed contract is one, the object of which 
is fully performed. All others are executory." Defendants 
contend that under these provisions the oral modification was 
invalid because it was not executed. Plaintiff contends, on 
the other hand, that in the case of building contracts an oral 
modification is fully executed when the work has been com-
pleted in accordance with its terms whether or not the agreed 
price has been paid. 
[2] Section 1698 has a dual operation. On the one hand 
it invalidates oral contracts of modification that are unexe-
cuted, and on the other hand, it validates executed agreements 
that might otherwise fail for lack of consideration. (Julian 
v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 76 [3 P.2d 1009].) Typical of the 
latter category are agreements to accept less than is due 
under the terms of a written contract (Julian v. Gold, S1t.pra 
[reduced rent] ; Sinnige v. Oswald, 170 Cal. 55, 57 [148 P. 
203] [same]; Taylor v. Taylor, 39 Cal.App.2d 518, 522 [103 
P.2d 575] [reduced monthly payments under a property 
settlement agreement]), or to accept performance ata later 
date than that provided in the writing. (Harloe v. Lambie, 
132 Cal. 133, 136 [64 P. 88] ; Henehan v. Hart, 127 Cal. 656, 
657-658 [60 P. 426].) [3] Since in such cases the modifica-
tion agreement requires no additional act or forbearance on 
the part of the obligor, it can only be executed to the extent 
that the obligee accepts performance in accordance with its 
terms. Accordingly, in the absence of a valid waiver of 
1\ condition (Knarston v. Manhattan Life 1118. Co., 140 Cal. 
57, 62-64 [73 P. 740] ; Panno v. RU8S0, 82 Cal.App.2d 408, 
412 [186 P.2d 452] ; Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co., 40 Cal. 
App.2d 341, 347 [104 P.2d 875]), or facts establishing an 
('stoppel to rely upon section 1698 (Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal. 
2d 416, 421·422 [65 P.2d 770] ; Panno v. Russo, supra). the 
section may only be satisfied by execution on the part of the 
obligee by accepting l('s than his due. (Stolttenberg v. Har-
l1eston, 1 Ca1.2d 264, 266 [34 P.2d 472] ; Henehan v. Hart, 
127 Cal. 656, 657-658 [60 P. 426] ; Stafford v. Clinard, 87 
Cal.App.2d 480, 481 [197 P.2d 84] ; Battaglia v. Winchester 
) 
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Dried Pruit 00., 32 Cal.App.2d 436, 437 [90 P.2d 111] ; Har-
"ey v. DeGarmo, 129 Cal.App. 487, 492-493 [18 P.2d 971]; 
~Jiddlecamp v. Z1/mwolt, 100 Ca1.App. 715, 722-725 [280 P. 
1003].) 
[4] The situation is different, however, where there is 
{'onsideration for the oral modification agreement. In such 
cases the rights and duties of both part ips to the ,vritten 
contract are affected, and by performing the contract as 
modified each party will be in a position to execute the oral 
agreement on his side. It is necessary to determine, there-
fore, whether in such cases execution by onc party is sufficient 
to allow him to enforce the modification against the other. 
The language of the cases is in conflict. It has been stated 
that an oral agreement to be executed within the meaning 
of section 1698 must be fully performed on both sides. (Pear-
sall v. Heflry, 153 Cal. 314, 325 [95 P. 154, 159] ; Klein Nor-
ton' 00. v. Oohen, 107 Cal.App. 325, 330 [290 P. 613] j Walther 
v. OccidentaZ Life Ins. 00 .• 40 Cal.App.2d 160, 166 [104 P.2d 
5511; Keeler v. Murphy, 117 Cal.App. 386, 390 [3 P.2d 950] ; 
Sffoltcnberg v. HanJestnn. 1 Ca1.2d 264. 266 f34 P.2d 4721; 
Hert'ey v. DeGarmo, 129 Cal.App. 487, 492-493 [18 P.2d 
9711. ) In tbe Pearsall and Klei.n Norton cases it was held, 
however, that there had bpen a valld oral abrogation of the 
writtpn contract followed by a substitution of an enforceable 
oral contract. In the Kepler and Walther cases i.t was held 
that plaintiff had not performed the alleged oral agreement, 
anci in the Stoltenberg and Harvey pases there was no con-
siclpration for the modifieation. On the other hand, in cases 
in which there was adequatfl consideration for the oral modi-
fi('ation. and in which the party relying- therf>on had fully per-
formed. the contract has befln enforcf>d as modified \vhether or 
not the other party had performed on his part. (Wood v. , 
Nelsnn. 220 Cal. 139, 141 [29 P.2il 854] : Katz v. Bedford, 
77 Cal. 3]9, 323 [19 P. 523. 1 TJ.R.A. 8261: Roberts v. Wach-
fpr. 104 Cal.App.2d 271. 280 f231 P.2d 5341; N1tttman v. 
f!hais, 101 Cal.App.2d 476, 478 [22:) P.2d 6601; Lacy Mfg. 
Cn, v. Gold Orou'lI Mining Cn., 52 Clll.App.2d 568, 578 P26 
P.2d 6441 j Oatman v. Eddy, 4 Ca1.App. 58, 60 f87 P. 2101 ; 
spe, also, Ander80n v . • To'hmstoll, ]20 Cal. 657, 659 f53 P. 264] ; 
l~f()cHnn Oombiflcd H. &'7 Agr. Wks. v. Glens Palls Iml. (Jo., 
121 Cal. 167, 175 [53 P. !l651: ,!;ffate P. (Jo. v. HersheZ Oalif. 
P. P. Co .. 8 Cal.App,2d 524. !)2!l [47 P.2d 8211.) Since plain-
tiff has allE'ged an adequate considE'ration for the oral modifica: 
) 
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tion and full performance on its part under the terms thereof, 
it has stated a cause of action. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J~, con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The majority of this court, 
by a process disguised as statutory construction, strike the 
word "executed" from section 1698 of the Civil Code and 
invite fraudulent minded persons to perpetrate, and be re-
warded for, fraudulent schemes unhampered longer by rules 
which for centuries the accumulated wisdom of mankind had 
deemed desirable. 
The majority opinion is one further step in the court-erosion 
of salutary code provisions of this state which embody long-
standing rules of Anglo-American .law designed to prevent 
successful fraud and perjury. Provisions which have this 
purpose include the present rule (Civ. Code, § 1698), the 
statute of frauds (Civ. Code, §§ 1624, 1624a, 1724), and the 
aspect of the parol evidence rule (Civ. Code, § 1625) which 
would exclude extrinsic evidence of negotiatious which pre-
ceded or accompanied execution of an integrated writing to 
vary the terms of that writing. The latter rule was refused 
application by the majority of this court in Simmons v. Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology (1949), 34 Ca1.2d 264, 274 
[209 P.2d 581] (see dissenting opinion, pp. 290-292). 
Now the majority turn their attention to section 1698 
and, instead of accepting the clear import of the language 
(and the frequently stated holding) that "an executed oral 
agreement" means one which has been fully performed (see 
cases cited (ante, p. 433 [246 P.2d 948) of majority opin-
ion; Fuller v. Mann (1932), 119 Cal.App. 568, 573 [6 P.2d 
999]; Taylor v. Taylor (1940), 39 Cal.App.2d 518, 522 
[103 P.2d 5751). they announce that a written agreement 
can be modified by an oral agreement which has been per-
formed only by the party who seeks enforcement of the modi-
fying agreement. The two decisions of this court which the 
majority cite (amte. p. 433 [246 P.2d 948], as permitting such 
enforcement do so withont discussion of the reason for the 
rille. and without mention of Rection 1698 (Katz v. Bedford 
(1888)' 77 Cal. 319, 323 [19 P. 523. 1 L.R.A. 826] ; Wood v. 
Nelson (1934), 220 Cal. 139, 141 [29 P.2d 8541). The eases 
cited by the majority which characterize an agreement per-
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formed by plaintiff alone as "executed" ignore plain statutory 
language. Section 1661 of the Civil Code provides that" An 
executed contract is one, the object of which is fully per-
formed." The object of an oral modifying agreement is to 
modify the prior agreement, and this object is not fully per-
formed until the modifying agreement has been performed 
on both sides. . 
Writers upon the subject of parol modification of written 
contracts have recognized that in California by statute such 
modification can be accomplished only by a parol agreement 
fully performed on both sides (see 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 377, 
p. 866; 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 Rev.), Contracts, § 226, 
p. 162; 2 Rest., Contracts, §407, Cal. Annotations (1933». 
That this has been the California rule has been recognized even 
by writers who assume to characterize section 1698 as "bad" 
(6 Corbin, Contracts (1951), § 1316, p. 233) or "unfortunate" 
(6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), § 1828, p. 5179). 
As 1 have already indicated, in accord with the great weight 
of authority, reflecting the accumulated wisdom of centuries 
of striving for justice under law, I do not believe that the 
statute, aptly designed to prevent fraud, is "bad" or "un-
fortunate." The reason for rules such as that of section 1698, 
and of the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule, was 
well stated at least as long ago as 1604, in The Countess of 
Rutland's Case, (Trin. 2 Jac. 1) 5 Co.Rep. 25b, 26a-26b, 77 
Eng.Rep. 89, 90: "[I] t would be inconvenient, that matters 
in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which 
finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the par-
ties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be 
proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory. And 
it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all 
others in such cases, if such nude averments against matter 
in writing should be admitted." The reason is applicable 
here. A party to a written agreement should not be able, 
by rendering either a different performance from, or as here 
precisely the same as, that called for by the agreement and 
averring that such performance was rendered pursuant to 
an oral modification of the agreement, to require of the other 
party a performance different from that which the latter 
promised in writing. 
The precise holding of the majority here can be graphically 
illustrated by applying it to these more simple, but legally 
exactly parallel, facts: Seller agrees in writing to sell and 
deliver, and Buyer likewise agrees to accept and purchase, 
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1,000 short tons of steel a month for 12 months for a price 
of $110 a ton. Twelve thousand tons of steel are delivered. 
By today's decision, at the end of the year the door is wide 
open, and the court invites, fraudulent minded Mr. Seller 
to sue and recover twice the agreed selling price through the 
simple expedient of alleging that there was an oral modifying 
agreement, l1lt1de subsequent to the signing and delivery of 
the written contract but before delivery of the steel, that 
solely for purposes of computing the price to be paid a ton 
should be considered as consisting of 1,000 pounds; this court, 
consistently with its majority decision today, must uphold 
Seller in his argument tllat the oral agreement is executed 
in that Seller has fully performed by delivering the steel 
as agreed. 
In compliance with long-established law the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Hesprlllrlellts' petitioll for a rehearing was denied September 
4, 1932. Schaurr, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition shonlrl be granted. 
